Sector CIP Instruments - Digital Infrastructure
Sector CIP Instruments - Digital Infrastructure
This page provides an annotated list of Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) resources specifically focused on digital infrastructure.
Incorporating cyber resilience as a fundamental aspect of connectivity, reliability, and security will contribute to the advancement of SDG9, which aims to build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization, and foster innovation.
Ensuring cyber resilience is crucial for the digital infrastructure, which serves as the backbone of modern connectivity and plays a vital role in various sectors. By prioritizing resilience alongside reliability and security, we can create a robust and sustainable digital infrastructure that supports economic growth, inclusivity, and innovation, aligning with the objectives of SDG9.
Organization | Title | Year ↓ | Type | Description |
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency | Methodology for assessing the most critical information and communications technologies and services | 2020 | Executive order | This EO addresses the threat posed by the unrestricted acquisition or use of Information and Communications Technology (ICT) and services “designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by persons owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of foreign adversaries,” and declares a national emergency concerning this threat. |
National Center for Communications Security | Indian Telecom Security Assurance Requirements For Home Subscriber Server (HSS) | 2020 | Security Assurance Standards | This report identifies the need for the establishment of a pan-European systemic cyber incident coordination framework (EU-SCICF) to mitigate the risk of coordination failure. The objective behind such a mechanism is to increase the level of preparedness of financial authorities in the EU and to define a coherent and thus more effective response to a cyber incident. The EU-SCICF should help bridge any coordination and communication gaps between financial authorities themselves, with other sector authorities, and with other key actors at the international level. As such, it should complement existing coordination and communication protocols. To ensure the non-duplication of frameworks, the EU-SCICF should correlate with the existing financial crisis framework and EU cyber incident landscape. |